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Public Morality, Liberalism and Virtue Ethics 
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The Concept of Public Morality 
My goal in this paper is to sketch answers to the following questions: (1) In what 
ways has there been a breakdown in public morality in contemporary society?  (2) To 
what extent, if any, is the widespread acceptance of liberalism the cause of such 
breakdown?  And (3) How can this state of affairs be ameliorated?  Before I set out to 
answer these questions let me begin by defining the concept of public morality that is 
central to my discussion.  
By public morality I mean the observance of and subscription to certain basic or 
fundamental values that I consider a sine qua non for human existence in any social 
order/setting.  These values include, but are not limited to, trust, honesty, fairness, 
integrity, shame, self-respect and honor.  I have not included caring, sharing, empathy 
and similar values because it can be argued that these values, though vital, are learned 
and acquired in a social context through nurturing. Thus, to prescribe them as 
foundational to society would clearly be circular.  I take my list of values as a paramount 
precondition for social life; meaning that they are presupposed by any cooperative 
endeavor and without them the human being simply cannot exist meaningfully.  
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My justification for the primacy of the list of values I have prescribed draws 
support from a basic observation about the human condition by earlier philosophers such 
as Aristotle and Hume, among others.  For both Aristotle and Hume, the human being is 
not only naturally incapable of self-subsistence but s/he also is designed by nature for 
social existence.
1
   
I shall call this idea the ontological dependency of the human being.  In speaking 
of “the union of those who cannot exist without each other . . ., namely, of male and 
female,” Aristotle takes the ontological dependency of the human being both as a given 
and as foundational to the state (Politics 1. 1252.25)
2
.  The individual cannot exist on 
her/his own and therefore, he/she, “is like a part in relation to the whole”.  To that end, 
Aristotle goes on to offer what he considers a “proof that the state is a creation of nature 
and prior to the individual.”  Also, Aristotle points to what he terms “A social instinct 
[that] nature has implanted in all men by nature” (ibid). 
Hume makes a similar point about the ontological dependency of the human being 
but from a slightly different perspective.  He begins by noting nature‟s “cruelty” to the 
human species in endowing us with “numberless wants and necessities”, but with very 
limited abilities to meet those wants and necessities.  In this respect we are unlike all the 
other animals in the natural kingdom.  Given our natural infirmities we are destined to 
perish but for the fact of society through which we are able to overcome those natural 
deficits.  As he puts it, “‟Tis by society alone . . . [that the human being] is able to supply 
his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire 
a superiority above them” (Treatise. 484-85).  Furthermore, Hume, as if echoing 
Aristotle, traces “the first and original principle of human society” to the “natural appetite 
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betwixt the sexes, which unites them [i.e. the sexes] together, and preserves their union” 
(Treatise. 486).  Even Hobbes, who may be regarded as the historical ancestor and chief 
spokesperson for individual existence within a contract model of governance, realizes 
that the very motivation of the human animal toward social arrangement in a political 
setting is mutual succor in a state of nature borne out of perpetual fear and an inherent 
vulnerability to suffer harm.
3
  
If then we theorized with some of our philosophical ancestors, particularly 
Hobbes, Hume and others about the origination of political society from an antecedent 
hypothetical, pre-political and individualistic mode of existence, we cannot but conclude 
with them that there are some basic values necessary for sociopolitical existence.  We 
may differ with them on the values we consider foundational, but there can be no denying 
that we share with them a belief in foundational values.
4
  I consider the values I have 
prescribed above to constitute those basics.  They are basic because, to repeat, without 
them the human being, as an ontologically dependent and thus necessarily social being, 
cannot exist in any meaningful sense whatsoever. Let me now very briefly illustrate this 
point a bit just so as to show how the values are implicated in and foundational to our 
social intercourse.  
Consider that unless I can trust that when you speak with me, for example, you 
mean what you say and you have no designs to mislead me, I have no reason to believe 
you since I have no way of verifying the content of your mind.  The issue here is the 
familiar logical privacy of mental states.  In believing you, therefore, I am assuming that 
you are honest. Furthermore, my assumptions about your honesty and trustworthiness 
entail also that I take you to have integrity (or self-respect) which you would not want to 
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risk jeopardizing, and to that extent you will endeavor to do that which will be conducive 
to earning my regard/respect for you.  Your action, verbal as well as nonverbal, will 
reflect a basic sense of moral propriety.  My point here is that communication 
presupposes an interplay between (or among) some of the values I have prescribed; 
communication is what links us together in a social setting, and it is only in such a social 
setting that our individual existence is rendered meaningful. 
But it might be contended that if it is true that social life is presupposed by such 
cornerstone values as I have prescribed wouldn‟t it follow that those values are natural to 
the human species?  And if they are natural, what sense then does it make to say that they 
can be eroded by human beings or human institutions (e.g. liberalism)?  To which I 
respond as follows: Saying that the values are foundational as I have claimed entails only 
that, ideally, they facilitate a healthy (read morally acceptable/commendable) and 
successful social intercourse.  My illustration above reflects only those considerations 
that are instrumental in facilitating such healthy and successful social intercourse.  But 
we know also that social intercourse can be aberrant or deviant.  By definition, aberrant 
or deviant forms of intercourse are in violation of a norm.  They are opposite to a norm.  
Both sets of values, then, the normative (or positive) and the deviant (or negative), are 
foundational to any social setting. It does not follow, however, that we are naturally good 
or naturally bad as may appear.  What, if anything, is natural about us is an inclination to 
pursue whatever we consider advantageous and to avoid those things we deem 
disadvantageous.  And sometimes, either inclination may cause us deliberately to mislead 
others through deception or lying.  But precisely because this pursuit of our advantage is 
purchased at the price of healthy and successful social intercourse it is deviant. It is to 
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avoid such deviant tendencies that our parents school or socially condition us – what 
Aristotle refers to as habituation
5
 -always to be honest even if our advantage is at stake, 
for the price of dishonesty and lying is isolation and ostracization.  So, no, saying that the 
values are foundational to society does not mean that they are natural in the sense 
claimed by the objection.  Whatever may be the origin of moral values, however, whether 
they are innate features of human noetic structure or humans are somehow socially 
conditioned to adopting them, the fact is that our holding certain values is a necessary 
condition for social intercourse.  
Still, it might perhaps be asked, how do these core values arise in society in the 
first place?  But, important as is this question, it will not concern me here.  The reason is 
that, as is already clear, my discussion is premised on the fact of morality in society.  My 
concern therefore is not with the origin but with the erosion or breakdown of moral 
values in contemporary society. It is this breakdown I now will elaborate. 
Liberalism and the Breakdown of Moral Values 
In the incessant quest for social advantage in contemporary society, both in the 
economic and in the non-economic spheres, the aforementioned core values are often 
seen as obstacles that deliberately must be cast aside, ignored, or subverted. This 
perception of and attitude toward moral values in general constitute the dominant ethos in 
society, and are manifested in their ugliest forms in the corporate world and among 
politicians, athletes and entertainers. Consider, for instance, the case of the energy 
corporation ENRON a few years back.  Here we have a situation in which the company 
was being plundered into bankruptcy by its executives at the same time its Chief 
Executive Officer, Kenneth Lay, was publicly declaring that the company was solvent 
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and thus was encouraging lower level employees not to sell their company stocks.  
Meanwhile, Lay and other senior executives, knowing full well the depreciating value of 
the company stocks, were busy selling (or “dumping”) their own stock holdings in the 
company.  By the time the correct information about the financial situation of the 
company was unearthed the company‟s stocks had plummeted and they had become 
practically worthless.  The net effect of all this on lower level employees was that many 
of them lost most, if not all, of their retirement savings which were held in company 
stocks.  Some employees had been working in the company for decades. 
Among politicians, recall President Bill Clinton‟s sexual impropriety with Monica 
Lewinsky, a then 22-year-old White House intern.  This affair almost cost Clinton his 
Presidency because, among other things, he brazenly and shamelessly looked directly 
into an array of television cameras and deliberately and intentionally tried to mislead the 
American people (and the rest of the world) into believing that he had never been 
sexually involved with Lewinsky.  We all remember Clinton‟s now infamous 
proclamation “I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Ms. Lewinsky” that he 
subsequently retracted under a Grand Jury questioning, and his reluctant admission that, 
indeed, he had had such relations.
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  More recently, there have been cases such as Senator 
Ted Stevens of Alaska who was found guilty and convicted on fraud charges; 
Congressman Mark Foley who was alleged to have been sending pornographic materials 
to an under age male Congressional Page; and Governor Rod Blagojevich of Illinois who, 
on December 9, 2008, was arrested by the FBI and indicted on fraud charges for 
allegedly attempting to “sell to the highest bidder” the Senate seat vacated by President-
elect Barack Obama.
7
  Finally, there are athletes and entertainers such as track and field 
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star Marion Jones and baseball player Barry Bonds, both alleged to have been engaged in 
unfair competitive practices by using illegal performance enhancing drugs.  Jones was 
found guilty and convicted of the crime, and also was stripped of all five gold medals she 
had unfairly won at the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia.  Bonds is currently 
under indictment.  
In all these instances of moral and even legal transgressions, what we have is a 
negation of trust; there is deception, lying, dishonesty, and an overall lack of integrity.  
The driving motivation in all such conduct is social advantage.  Where social advantage 
is the end, whatever means are thought necessary to attaining that end are also believed 
justified as long as those means are not prohibited by the law.  But even when there is 
legal prohibition, as we have seen, that does not stop some individuals.  At best, then, the 
only limiting constraint on the individual is fear of the law; otherwise all else is fair 
game.  This is the overriding ethos and culture of contemporary society.  
I see this ethos and culture as an unfortunate by-product, an unintended 
consequence, of liberal individualism with its rights-based conception of social life.
8
  By 
liberal individualism in the context of the present discussion I mean that aspect of the 
liberal doctrine that emphasizes an individual‟s right to pursue whatever the individual 
deems consistent with her/his interest unless otherwise prohibited by law.  I focus on this 
aspect of the doctrine cognizant that there is also the political aspect, known as political 
liberalism, which emphasizes and advocates government neutrality on conceptions of the 
good life as in matters of religion and morality overall. Political liberalism is central to 
the discussions by philosophers such as John Rawls, Will Kymlicka and Ronald 
Dworkin, among others.
9
  Of course, both aspects of liberalism are important in 
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significant ways; however, my discussion will focus on rights-based aspect of the 
doctrine because, in my view, it is this aspect that bears upon the issue of public morality 
with which I am here concerned.  
In the context of the present discussion, therefore, liberalism as a rights-based 
theory bears the burden for the breakdown in public morality (or the erosion of core 
values), at least in my view, because it happens to be the doctrine around which 
sociopolitical life in Western societies has been organized since modernity.
10
  
Modernity‟s emphasis on individual (or civil) liberties, to which contemporary society is 
heir, makes sociopolitical life a rights-based oriented issue.  This rights-based conception 
of social life is reflected in the economic and the non-economic spheres. In the economic 
sphere, liberalism engenders the pursuit of material prosperity through the unrestrained 
acquisition of wealth so long as no laws are violated, and in the non-economic sphere it 
promotes a hedonistic view of life through unrestrained freedom in the quest for 
individual happiness.  It may even be said that it is in order to advance this conception of 
social life that a rights-based society circumscribes limits on the power of the government 
vis-à-vis the individual.  This is clearly the thrust of John Locke‟s central ideas in the 
Second Treatise.  And John Stuart Mill too, whose principal focus is on the individual, 
lucidly expresses this point as follows:  
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized community [read Western democratic society], against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant . . .  The only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amenable to 
society, is that which concerns others.  In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign.
11
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If one reads Mill as stipulating a criterion for determining when and when not to 
interfere with an individual‟s rights, known as the Harm Principle, then one has to know 
what those rights are in the first place that may or may not be infringed.  To that end 
liberal societies codify those rights in the law and they become legal rights.  The United 
States Constitution, for instance, explicitly declares that the individual has an “inalienable 
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”  But the content of this right itself, 
especially as it pertains to individual happiness, is indeterminate and variable.  That is, 
what constitutes happiness is open to interpretation from time to time and varies with 
each individual.  And it is precisely on account of this indeterminacy and variability of 
the concept of happiness that problems of morality arise, for any form of conduct not 
otherwise proscribed by the law can be claimed to be conducive to individual happiness 
and thus claimed to be consistent with the right affirmed by the Constitution.  It does not 
matter that the conduct so claimed may be viewed by some as morally questionable or as 
defying our basic moral intuition or even as downright morally revolting.
12
  As long as 
the conduct is not prohibited by law it is open to being claimed as a right insofar as the 
claimant believes that no one is being harmed by it.  That is why, if challenged, the 
individual would be prepared to have the challenge litigated.  Examples of such litigation 
in the recent past have been the burning of the US flag as an expression of Free Speech 
guaranteed by the Constitution, in this case the right to dissent, and (sometimes also) 
cross burning which too had been claimed as an expression of Free Speech.  (Cross 
burning was ruled illegal, however, because it was (and still is) rightly interpreted as an 
expression of racial hatred and intimidation, and thus not an expression of Free Speech.)  
In any case, there lies the larger issue for, given the legitimate distinction between 
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morality and law, morality is taken to be a matter of taste, and taste is subjective.  If 
modernity therefore has liberated the individual from the shackles of tradition, state 
tyranny and religious dogma, then in all matters pertaining to the individual, especially in 
the domain of morals, the individual‟s taste is deemed sovereign.  Put otherwise, 
individual autonomy in the moral domain translates into a sovereignty of taste. It now can 
be seen why I characterized the breakdown of basic values as an unintended consequence 
of liberalism.  
To be sure Mill, in defending the individual from state interference, was not 
suggesting that anything goes morally in the pursuit of individual happiness – tempting as 
it may be to read him in such an ungenerous way.  I am unwilling to allow, in other 
words, that Mill‟s defense of individual liberty in the pursuit of happiness entails moral 
chaos considering that his interest was to protect individual liberty within a “civilized 
community.”  Moreover, from Mill‟s utilitarian perspective, a civilized community would 
be one whose morality is aimed at maximizing the happiness of the greater number of the 
members in the moral community.  In light of these reasons, therefore, I take it as an a 
priori that Mill‟s putative civilized community is anything but morally chaotic.  To 
reinforce this point, let me invoke William A. Galston‟s observation that liberalism 
shares certain general virtues (understood as values) with any other type of society, 
virtues that assure social stability.
13
  These include courage, law-abidingness and loyalty.  
Galston notes further that certain virtues are specific to a liberal society.  Examples are 
independence (or autonomy), because of the individualism that liberalism fosters; a 
strong work ethic; recognition and respect of the rights of others; and adaptability in a 
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changing economic and social environment (ibid).  As virtues, these are what make for 
social stability in a liberal polity. 
Yet, for all that, and perhaps even paradoxically, it is these very core virtues in 
liberalism that, in my judgment, lead to the unintended consequence of occasioning a 
breakdown in public morality.  For, to repeat, because of liberalism‟s emphasis on 
individuality and autonomy, but particularly the doctrine‟s privileging of rights over all 
else especially in the pursuit of individual happiness, liberalism ends us with the 
unwitting consequence of allowing for a subjectivist view of morals.  This is all the more 
so when there is no legal proscription otherwise. And it is this subjectivist outlook that 
has permeated contemporary society. 
It might perhaps be suggested in defense of liberalism that some of the most 
egregious moral crimes committed in the recent past have been owing to moral 
fanaticism by those who hold very strong dogmatic beliefs.  Hitler and the Nazis, for 
example, thought they had a moral duty to exterminate the Jews and those they 
considered socially undesirable; Pol Pot of Cambodia thought he had a moral duty to 
create the Killing Fields for those regarded as non-conformists; and Josef Stalin and Mao 
Tse Tung thought they were doing what was morally right to reform their respective 
society.  So, if one draws upon these recent past events it would seem that liberalism, by 
fostering autonomy and individuality as against group-thinking, has liberated Western 
societies from any such moral fanaticism or at least the strength of those moral beliefs 
that lead to the kind of moral outrages history has witnessed.  And if the price to pay for 
such liberation and individual autonomy that liberalism promotes is a subjectivist outlook 
on morality, then it is indeed a worthwhile price considering the alternative 
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consequences, as represented by the examples just mentioned, that liberalism has allowed 
us to avoid. 
Unquestionably, this is a salient objection.   I concede that the objection 
highlights a major virtue of liberalism, namely, that a liberal society socializes its 
members to be conscious of their individual rights, to be custodians of those rights, and to 
be vigilant in protecting and defending those rights against possible encroachment by the 
government.  At least partially because of this socialization we have been very successful 
in staving off potential threats from personality figures like Hitler, at least in the West.  
Although this is true, however, it is true also that liberalism runs the other extreme of 
deifying rights in a manner that seems to conflict with some of our generally held 
common sense views of the morally acceptable.  And it is this deification of rights that 
sometimes threatens the very core moral values that are presupposed in society. 
To illustrate this point, consider the right claimed by the social group, the North 
American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA).  This group advocates and promotes 
sexual relations between men and boys as a right in so far as the parties are willing and 
uncoerced.  But this right-claim itself is morally troubling and highly problematic, for a 
boy by definition is a minor and not an adult; so to advocate sexual relations between a 
man and a boy, even assuming there are no legal proscriptions otherwise, is to advocate a 
relation between an adult and a minor.
14
  We consider any form of sexual relation 
between adults and minors morally aberrant.  Such advocacy therefore of NAMBLA, and 
by extension the group‟s purported right-claim, clearly challenges our basic common 
sense moral beliefs about human sexual relations.  No doubt this is an extreme example, 
but it does illustrate the point about the deification of rights that liberalism seems to 
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promote, even if unwittingly, to the point of absurdity.  There is no doubt that in matters 
of sexuality Mill‟s Harm Principle applies.  But it is reasonable to believe that its 
applicability is to relationships between consenting adults, not between minors and adults 
even if both parties are consenting.  We thus have a travesty in the tacit assumption and 
application of the Harm Principle to the kind of sexual relations promoted by NAMBLA.  
If I am right then in saying that liberalism has unwittingly promoted the 
deification of rights that somehow conflicts with our common sense moral values, then 
unless measures are taken to the contrary, liberalism will have sown the seeds of its own 
destruction. How then is the situation to be ameliorated? I take up this question in section 
IV.  Meanwhile, I want to briefly examine a few “traditionalist” attempts at addressing 
the issue of the erosion of values in contemporary society.  I characterize these responses 
as “traditionalist” because, essentially, their argument is for a return to so-called 
traditional values.  I propose to reject such responses 
Some Traditionalist Responses: A Wrongheaded Approach 
David Popenoe attributes the breakdown of values to a collapse of the traditional 
two-parent family and hence to the social environment in which parenting occurs and in 
which the child is raised.
15
 Popenoe‟s reasoning is that values are a reflection of the 
community, and they are transmitted through the family from the parents to the child.  
Thus, where the family unit has broken down the values that should be passed down to 
the child do not get transmitted (Popenoe, 1995, 72-73).  But in addition to the collapse 
of the two-parent family structure, as Popenoe sees it, Popenoe notes also a breakdown in 
the community within which the family is situated and which also is the main custodian 
and repository of community values.  As he says,  
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[A]ll across America, community value dissensus is in the ascendancy.  Much 
attention has focused on public schools and their failure to provide value 
reinforcement.  Another important area of value conflict is between families and 
the world of work, which typically operates as if workers had no families.  One of 
the most significant examples of value conflict in America today, of course, is 
between the values families try to teach their children and those commonly 
expressed through the mass media.  
 
American parents today believe they are a beleaguered lot, living in an 
increasingly hostile community environment where value consensus is more and 
more problematic.  Their neighborhoods have become anonymous, their 
neighbors are dis-interested, and crime and personal security are constant 
problems.  They feel isolated and unappreciated and view their task as a lonely 
and risky one.  Popular culture has become an enemy, not a friend. To make 
matters worse, their own parents now live at a distance, and they have fewer and 
fewer relatives on whom to rely for personal support. (Popenoe, 1995, 83). 
 
The upshot of Popenoe‟s analysis (or diagnosis) of the problem is that contemporary 
society is isolationist in that it fosters an atomistic existence – what he variously calls 
“extreme individualism” (1995, 84), “radical individualism” (1995, 85), and “hyper-
individualism” (1995, 86) that derive from modernity.  Whereas in the past the family 
was embedded in the community, now the family seems to stand alone assailed by 
various external forces against which it is incapable of coping.
16
  Popenoe then proceeds 
to offer some recommendations to address the problem of the decline in moral values in 
society.  
One major recommendation he puts forward is the cultivation and adoption of 
what he describes as a “natural communities policy” (Popenoe, 1979, 94).  This is a 
policy that harkens back to tribal- or village like life. 
On his view, the tribe or village is the sanctuary of the family.  It protects the 
family against external or outside forces.  A natural communities‟ policy, then, ensures 
that the corrupting outside forces are kept at bay. What are those forces?  They are the 
market and the state.  Thus, says Popenoe, a natural communities policy, “at minimum, 
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enjoins both the market and the state from doing further damage to civil society” 
(Popenoe, 1995, 94).  And, on the positive side, such a policy would be directed at 
upholding and respecting “the wishes and concerns of local cultural groupings.”  Indeed, 
continues Popenoe, “functioning local communities should in some cases be protected 
from the intrusion of outsiders” (ibid). 
To advance his idea further Popenoe advocates the cultivation of “homogenous 
neighborhoods” and some kind of neighborhood or community watchdog mechanism that 
would be responsible for “establishing and enforcing” community values and moral 
standards (Popenoe, 1995, 96-97).  Suspecting, however, that the concept of homogeneity 
might be construed as an expression of racism or ethnocentrism, Popenoe promptly tries 
to assure the reader that he is “not thinking here necessarily of racial or ethnic enclaves 
but of family-focused enclaves of people who share similar values and have a similar life-
style” (Popenoe, 1995, 97).  May be so.  But then, in the very next sentence and in the 
same breath in which he offers the disclaimer, Popenoe goes on to complain about 
American liberals and to rationalize his overall position saying: “American liberals have 
long looked askance at homogeneous neighborhoods . . . as undemocratic. But people 
strongly prefer to live next door to others with whom they feel comfortable and can form 
close friendships, and there is no reason they should not be allowed to – especially 
families with children” (Popenoe, 1995, 97). 
Finally, what kind of instruction should children in such natural communities and 
homogeneous neighborhoods be given?  They should be instructed in “our national and 
Western history and traditions” in addition to math, science and writing (Popenoe, 1995, 
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95).  And Popenoe calls for institutions of higher education too to do “more to promote 
national solidarity through stressing our common Western values” (ibid). 
Like Popenoe, former politician and one-time Presidential candidate, currently a 
political commentator and columnist, Patrick J. Buchanan, attributes the breakdown in 
moral values essentially to a collapse of the two-parent traditional family unit.
17
  But 
Buchanan sees the problem on a much larger scale than Popenoe, as is clear from the 
apocalyptic title of his book, The death of the West.  For Buchanan, the net result of the 
breakdown of values in contemporary society, among which is the value of the traditional 
two-parent heterosexual family as the basic unit of society, is the complete extinction of 
people of European ancestry.  By people of European ancestry Buchanan obviously 
means Western man and Western civilization.  In his words,  
[T]he death of the West is not a prediction of what is going to happen, it is a 
depiction of what is happening now.  First World nations are dying.  They face a 
mortal crisis, not because of something happening in the Third World, but 
because of what is not happening at home and in the homes of the First World.  
Western fertility rates have been falling for decades.  Outside of Muslim Albania, 
no European nation is producing enough babies to replace its population.  As 
years slip by, that birthrate is not stabilizing; it is falling.  In a score of countries, 
the old are dying off faster than the young are being born (Buchanan, 2002, 23; 
emphasis in the original). 
 
But how does the breakdown of basic moral values such as trust, sympathy, ideas of right 
and wrong, good and bad, self-worth etc have such an apocalyptic consequence?  And 
who is responsible for this gloomy situation?  
According to Buchanan, the destruction of moral values commenced in the sixties 
with the Civil Rights Movement when, following African American demands for civil 
rights, women demanded equal rights with men in all spheres of life.  With this demand 
for equality women thus sought and eventually gained economic freedom by competing 
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with men in the public sphere.  Almost contemporaneous with this challenge of the status 
quo was the invention and use of contraceptives which gave women control over their 
reproductive capacities.  Buchanan sees women‟s economic freedom and their use of 
birth control as effectively collapsing what he calls “The old sanctions against 
promiscuity” (Buchanan, 2002, 30).  And from this point on society was sent on a 
slippery slope of moral decline: free and unregulated sex without the social stigma of out 
of wedlock pregnancies and diseases; abortion as a right; the expendability and 
dispensability of men because of the development of new technologies that made possible 
in vitro fertilization and sperm preservation in sperm banks; the rise of voluntary single-
parenthood status as a choice for women; the destruction of traditional marriage, and 
hence the erosion of the traditional two-parent heterosexual family.  All of this owing to 
feminism and the pill!  As Buchanan puts it, with the discovery and use of the pill, 
“Nature‟s sanctions – unwanted pregnancy and fear of disease – were taken care of by the 
pill, available abortion, and the new miracle drugs. No need for shotgun marriages.  One 
teary-eyed trip to the Center for Reproductive Rights gets the job done” (Buchanan, 
2002, 30).  
It is clear that, for Buchanan, the chief culprit for what he takes to be the death of 
the West via an erosion of so-called traditional values is feminism.  Indeed, he says as 
much: “the rise of feminism spells the death of the nation and the end of the West” 
(Buchanan, 2002, 42).  This is because, for Buchanan, in light of women gaining control 
over their reproductive capacities and exercising their reproductive rights, as well as their 
obtaining economic freedom from men, a new measure of morality emerged.  This is a 
measure that did not use the standard of right and wrong as such, but instead used protest-
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participation for rights and against the status quo as the measure of morality or moral 
worthiness. In other words, those who protested in favor of Black civil rights in the 
South, who protested against apartheid in South Africa, and who protested against the 
Vietnam War were deemed moral in contradistinction to those who favored the 
government‟s policies in the South or toward South Africa and in Vietnam (Buchanan, 
2002, 31).  Given this new standard of morality, society was headed in an entirely new 
direction from that in which Buchanan said he grew up.  Buchanan laments: “The 
America many of us grew up in is gone” (Buchanan, 2002, 46).  Buchanan therefore 
recommends “a social counterrevolution” to bring back the status quo.  This anaphoric 
bent is reflected in Buchanan‟s rhetorical assertion, “What is going to convert American 
women to wanting what their mothers wanted and grandmothers prayed for: a good man, 
a home in the suburbs, and a passel of kids?  Sounds almost quaint” (Buchanan, 2002, 
47).
18
 
Two questions need to be raised at this point on which to focus my critique of the 
traditionalists‟ diagnosis of the problem and their proposed solutions: (1) Are the reasons 
offered for the erosion of morality in contemporary society by the traditionalists 
accurate?  And (2) are the proposed solutions of the traditionalists adequate to address the 
problem?  To address these questions, I will begin with the views of Buchanan.  As we 
have just seen, Buchanan attributes the decline in moral values to feminism.  This view of 
course assumes that, prior to the gender revolution of the sixties, society was stable and 
our basic sense of morality was not in way violated. In other words, there was no social 
injustice, no unfairness, and there was universal happiness.  But if this is true, why then 
was there a social revolution?  I use the expression “social revolution” because Buchanan 
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suggests as a rectification of the situation a “social counterrevolution” (Buchanan, 47).  
There may well have been social stability as Buchanan claims, but it was obtained at the 
price of tremendous social injustice that violated our basic moral sensibilities.  The 
nuclear family ensured social stability, but it did so then by denigrating women in 
conceptualizing them as cognitively inferior to men and thus excluding them from the 
public sphere and instead confining them to the private sphere of the home.  Moreover, 
even the work women performed in the home was devalued as natural in the sense of 
consistent with their biological make-up and therefore of less social significance than 
what men do in the public sphere.
19
   
Some feminists have characterized this exclusionary practice and the devaluation 
of women‟s labor in the home while also denigrating women‟s intellectual capacities as a 
form of exploitation comparable to the exploitation of Blacks under the vile institution of 
slavery.
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  I doubt that Buchanan would wish to argue that such practices were morally 
right and therefore justifiable to the extent that they assured social stability.  It follows 
therefore that the victims of exploitative and oppressive practices had a moral duty and 
right to overthrow the status quo.  This inference would undoubtedly be endorsed by John 
Locke, the intellectual forefather of the American society, and even Thomas Hobbes.  It 
was the social injustice inherent in the status quo for which Buchanan is pining that the 
social revolution of the sixties challenged purely on moral grounds.  We should in this 
respect recall Martin Luther King‟s apt summation of the situation then: “Injustice 
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”1  Buchanan seems to have historicized the 
problems of the sixties very differently from what they really were. 
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Does it follow from the fact of the social (read sexual) revolution of the period, as 
is claimed by Buchanan, that we have a decline in moral values in contemporary society? 
Notwithstanding what Buchanan says, he does not establish any such alleged causal 
connection.  All he does is to allege a slippery slope that is dubious.  But to appreciate 
why he posits such a slippery slope we need to remember that Buchanan‟s larger concern 
is his fear that the United States and the entire Western hemisphere are being overrun by 
people of non-European ancestry (read nonwhites).  In the United States, in particular, 
Buchanan is worried about immigration from non-European societies at the same time 
there is a decline in the birth rate of whites.  Apropos is his seemingly rhetorical assertion 
about the United States immigration policy from nonwhite societies in contrast to white 
societies on the television program This week With David Brinkley of January 8, 1991: “If 
we had to take a million immigrants in, say Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put 
them up in Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and would cause less 
problems for the people of Virginia?”21  It would seem then that to harken back to earlier 
times and their prevailing values is, at the very least, to yearn for those times when racial 
exclusionary practices and segregation, together with gender exclusion and related moral 
transgressions, were the norm.  Since contemporary society sees racial issues very 
differently from those earlier times, as evidenced in the recent election of Barack Obama 
as the first African American to the Presidency of the United States, and given that 
nonwhites are reproducing more than whites, as Buchanan claims, Buchanan thus sees 
racial interaction with and immigration from nonwhite societies as ultimately leading to 
the eradication of people of European ancestry.
22
  To that extent, his concern is not just 
limited to the United States; it extends to the entire European Western hemisphere. 
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It is clear from Buchanan‟s larger agenda, however, that his primary concern is 
not about a decline in moral values in society as such, notwithstanding appearances to the 
contrary, but rather with a specific political agenda presented under the guise of a moral 
concern.  I say this because he does invoke issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and 
related social matters as key moral concerns in society.  But he draws upon these social 
issues only because they are instrumental to his aim of showing that the sexual revolution 
of the sixties, as well as Western immigration policies, is the causative factor of what he 
considers the death of the West.  So, to the first of the two questions I posed earlier, 
namely, whether or not the traditionalists‟ account of the decline of morality in society is 
accurate, the answer is certainly no insofar as the position of Buchanan is concerned.  
This is because the underlying assumptions about morality and social justice on which 
Buchanan‟s argument for social stability is grounded are just plain wrong.  And to the 
second question whether or not the proposed solution of the traditionalists to the problem 
of the decline of moral values in contemporary society is adequate, here again, in the case 
of Buchanan‟s anaphoric solution, the answer is a firm no.  To harken back to earlier 
times is to harken back to a period of grave moral transgressions against certain groups.  
But then such a solution has no relevance to the problems of moral decline we face in 
contemporary society.  Nothing therefore needs be said about Buchanan‟s lip-service to 
the decline of moral values in contemporary society.  
Turning now to Popenoe, it can be said that, unlike Buchanan, he has offered 
some substantive arguments for advancing a traditionalist perspective.  He identifies 
some major institutional and social factors that account for the breakdown of moral 
values in contemporary society, including the collapse of the two-parent family structure.  
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For example, he notes that there is a conflict between the domestic world of the family 
and the external world of work.  In particular, given the economic conditions of 
modernity, families are too busy struggling to eke out a living and thus are left with very 
little time to effectively address the values needs of their children.  Such economic 
pressures as are felt by families have a multiplier effect on the community as a whole, 
given that the community is an extension of the family.  Added to this is the fact that 
parents find themselves competing with and struggling against the values of popular 
culture that invade the home through the media.  The gratuitous display and 
glamorization of sex and nudity on prime time television programs and even comedies; 
deception, lying, and manipulative forms of behavior that bespeak shamelessness; the 
glamorization of crime and violence; and the obscene flaunting of material things – these 
are just some of the values that popular culture present as virtues.  So, I would agree with 
Popenoe that, to the extent that such values seem to predominate in contemporary society 
and influence the mind of the unsuspecting young, they contribute significantly to the 
decline in moral values.  
Nevertheless, I have some serious problems with Popenoe‟s suggested remedies.  
First, Popenoe, like Buchanan, betrays a nostalgia for earlier times as if those times were 
bereft of any moral problems.  He advocates a development of what he terms a “natural 
communities” policy along the lines of the tribe or the village.  But what does “natural” 
mean?  This question is all the more important because Popenoe speaks of cultivating and 
creating “homogenous neighborhoods” in which the children would be given instruction 
in “our national and Western history and traditions.”  The problem here is that, given his 
criteria of homogeneity and comfortableness that determine membership in natural 
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community neighborhoods, Popenoe is advocating a form of segregation and 
discrimination – (racial?) – as the antidote to the moral decline in society.  Added to this, 
his emphasis on Western history and traditions would seem to imply that the moral 
problems with which we are faced are owing to an infusion of non-Western history, 
traditions and values.  But what might these non-Western histories, traditions and values 
be?  If Western society supposedly is taken to be white - and here Buchanan‟s use of the 
expression “European ancestry” (Buchanan, 2002, 42) is germane - then clearly 
Popenoe‟s use of “Western” translates into Buchanan‟s people of European ancestry, 
meaning whiteness.
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  What this means, in essence, is that the moral decline with which 
we are confronted is owing to the fact that America is supposedly losing its whiteness.  
And here, it is as if Popenoe is echoing Buchanan sans Buchanan‟s explicit political 
agenda. 
Against this background, we should read Popenoe‟s recommendations for the 
creation of homogenous neighborhoods as an advocacy for the balkanization of the 
society into pocket groups of people who look like each other and who, in his view, do 
not seem to share anything in common with people who appear different.  When we 
factor in his recommendation that Western history, traditions and values are what need to 
be taught in schools, as if this is what would stem the tide of moral decline in society, we 
see that Popenoe has decisively joined hands with Buchanan in singing a xenophobic 
song: morals decline in contemporary society because non-Western (read non-white) 
values, history and traditions are prevailing and eclipsing Western (read white) values, 
history and traditions.  Overall, then, Popenoe‟s recommendations for addressing the 
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issue of moral decline in contemporary society are very reactionary and even smack of 
xenophobia. 
Second, Popenoe‟s idea of establishing community values and having a 
community values enforcement mechanism is problematic at least and has an 
undemocratic tendency at worst.  How would such community values be established in 
the first place?  By whose authority and by what methods or procedures can any value be 
determined to be the community‟s value?  It is very easy to envisage a situation in which 
some influential and dominant individuals or group members within the community 
would impose their own personal values on others and then claim those values as the 
community‟s values – a danger well noted by Mill in the following passage: 
The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose 
their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others , is so 
energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings 
incident to human nature, that it is hardly kept under restraint by anything but 
want of power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong 
barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in 
the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase (Mill, 1973, 488-89; cf. 
480-81). 
 
In short, we have a recipe for oppression and domination.  It is little wonder that Popenoe 
advances a pre-emptive indictment of liberals, saying that liberals would charge that the 
concept of homogenous neighborhoods is undemocratic. It certainly has such a tendency.  
Lastly, Popenoe‟s remedy for the erosion of morals in contemporary society is 
predicated on the erroneous assumption that individuals have fixed or static and singular 
identities.  He fails to realize that, to the contrary, individuals in contemporary society 
have multiple and malleable identities that sometimes cut across racial, ethnic, cultural 
and gender lines.  For example, an individual may be white, female, Christian or Jewish 
and gay in a society or community that is largely patriarchal and privileges 
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heterosexuality.  Such an individual has multiple identities that she has to negotiate daily 
especially since the society emphasizes so-called “traditional values.”   What this means, 
in effect, is that although such an individual may be racially homogenous with the rest of 
the community, still, she would not fit very well into the neighborhood community 
Popenoe has in mind because some of her values clearly conflict with those of the 
community.  This goes to show that the idea of moral values grounded on the concept of 
homogeneity that Popenoe seems anxious to promote is impracticable, anachronistic, and 
completely out of step with the complex make-up of a pluralistic society.  And 
contemporary societies are complex and pluralistic. 
In light of the foregoing observations, and going back to the two questions I posed 
earlier about the accuracy of the traditionalists‟ diagnosis of the problem of morals in 
contemporary society and the adequacy of their suggested remedies, I conclude the 
following about Popenoe.  His diagnosis of the problem is adequate; however, his 
proposed solutions are wrongheaded.  
Virtue Ethics as Remedy 
With modernity‟s emphasis on the individual as an atomistic agent and essentially 
a rights-bearer, moral terms have as their ultimate referent individual actions, meaning 
that it is actions that are praiseworthy or blameworthy.  In general, within the context of 
modernity moral appraisal is of individual actions that positively or negatively affect 
members of the moral community.  Motives are significant in such enterprises, but only 
insofar as they enable evaluators to explain why the agent acted as s/he did – i.e. to give 
reasons for the agent‟s action -- thereby qualifying the agent for sanction.  Admittedly, 
not all modern moral philosophers subscribe to the view that moral evaluation is 
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concerned with individual actions sui generis.  Hume, for example, emphasizes 
individual character as the ultimate source of moral action in maintaining that moral 
valuation is concerned principally with the quality of individual character and only 
derivatively with individual actions.  He states:  
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, „tis only as a sign of some quality or 
character.  It must depend upon some durable principles of the mind, which 
extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character.  Actions 
themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on 
love (i.e. moral approbation) or hatred (i.e. moral disapprobation), pride or 
humility; and consequently are never consider‟d in morality (Treatise. 575, 
emphasis in the original).
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Hume here conceptualizes the morality of an action as he does because he considers 
actions as expressions of individual characters; thus to say an action is morally pleasant 
or odious, in the requisite sense of being morally approvable or disapprovable, is to make 
an evaluative statement about the individual‟s character from which the action flows.  On 
this basis, therefore, Hume is advancing a position on virtue ethics.
25
  
While this is not the place for a discussion of the history of ethics, let alone about 
the origin of virtue ethics, it can safely be said, nonetheless, that the primary concern with 
and systematic treatment of the nature of moral virtue as a cardinal element in moral 
theorizing is Aristotle.
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  It is Aristotle‟s concept of moral virtue, elements of which I 
believe are present in Hume‟s virtue ethics, that I now will draw upon to propose a 
solution to the moral crisis that we face in contemporary society.  I do so in the belief that 
unless we begin to focus on individual characters from which actions flow and derive 
their moral merit or demerit we would not be able to overcome the crisis.  
Central to Aristotle‟s concern in the Nicomachean Ethics is the nature of moral 
virtue.  Aristotle defines moral virtue as a state of character, a dispositional state of the 
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agent in virtue of which the agent would choose to perform certain types of actions in 
appropriate situations.  A distinctive attribute of this disposition is that it is acquired in 
consequence of a formed habit over a protracted period of time.  Preempting the view that 
moral virtue may be thought of as an innate disposition, Aristotle says: “moral virtue 
comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by a 
slight variation from the word ethos” (Nicomachean Ethics. 1103a, 15; emphasis added).  
This habit is formed as a result of the agent choosing to imitate the type of actions 
normally performed by those persons already believed to possess the requisite disposition 
(understood as character trait) which the agent desires.  Hence Aristotle will declare that 
we acquire the virtues by first exercising (i.e. practicing) them, much like men (and 
women) becoming builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre 
(Nicomachean Ethics. 1103b).  In short, it is by practice that we eventually would acquire 
the habit (or disposition) of performing the requisite kind of actions that flow from the 
appropriate kind of character-disposition we seek.  
Because of the centrality of choice in the enterprise of acquiring moral virtues, 
Aristotle will elaborate the concept of choice in terms of the principle of right rule of 
reason – what he calls the mean (Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b).   As a rational principle, 
the mean is the midpoint between two extremes as best can be determined by the agent in 
light of the circumstances in which s/he finds herself/himself.  Choices and actions that 
approximate the mean are virtuous, whereas choices and actions that fall on either side of 
the mean, as a deficiency or as an excess, are vicious.  Given this view, Aristotle 
proceeds to define moral virtue as “a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a 
mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by 
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that rational principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” 
(Nichomachean Ethics. 1107a).  This principle of the mean is significant in Aristotle‟s 
discussion because it enables us to determine what type of actions we ought to choose to 
practice in order to be able to acquire the habit or disposition from which such actions 
often derive.  Aristotle makes this point very clearly: “we must examine the nature of 
actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the 
states of character that are produced [by them]” (Nichomachean Ethics. 1104).  
Obviously, there is a lot more to Aristotle‟s virtue ethics than I can provide or 
discuss here.  What is significant for my present purpose, however, is that, based on the 
foregoing brief outline of aspects of Aristotle‟s moral theory, it now can be seen why I 
think it necessary to shift our attention from individual actions to the development of 
moral virtue in the form of character traits in order to address the moral crisis that we 
face in society.  As formed habits and settled dispositions, character traits are relatively 
enduring, as is to be expected; hence they cannot very easily be acquired.  As Aristotle 
would say, one swallow does not make a summer (Nicomachean Ethics. 1098, 15).  
Similarly, as settled dispositions, they cannot very easily be lost.  It is in this way that 
they are seen as long-term causal conditions for particular types of moral actions.
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  It 
stands to reason therefore that an emphasis on character acquisition or formation would 
assure a reliable basis for morality in contemporary society.   
In so far then as stemming the tide of moral decline in society, where emphasis is 
placed on individuals having virtuous moral characters, not only would we ensure a 
relatively enduring basis on which individual moral choices and decisions are grounded, 
but also we would have a reliable evidential basis for believing that such moral choices 
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and decisions that individuals make often would trump considerations of rights especially 
in cases of putative conflicts between moral demands and rights claims as illustrated by 
the NAMBLA example mentioned earlier.  It is in this way, I submit, that virtue ethics 
may be the antidote to a morality that is rights-based in a liberal society.  Thus, while 
acknowledging the importance of individual rights that is definitive of and vital to 
liberalism, moral education on virtue ethics, with its emphasis on individual character, 
hopefully will mitigate the unintended consequences of such rights-based claims that 
sometimes very seriously conflict with our basic, practical, commonsense moral beliefs.  
Of course, such a position as I have elaborated may invite the following types of 
questions: Who decides on what virtues society should promote?  Should moral education 
be the province of the state (public) or the parents (private)? If the former, what becomes 
of individual liberties, more particularly parental rights in a liberal society, that empower 
parents to raise their children and promote their children‟s well-being as they think fit?28  
In response to these questions let me begin by noting that throughout the ages 
different societies have promoted different (sets of) virtues.  For example, ancient Greek 
society promoted the four cardinal virtues about which Plato speaks in his Republic: 
wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. The Stoics promoted self-control.  Medieval 
Christendom promoted religious piety.  So, against this backdrop it is not difficult to 
believe that contemporary society would uphold as core virtues the basic values of 
honesty, truth-telling, fairness, integrity (or self-respect), shame and the like that I 
promulgated as a precondition for social life. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that even 
people with supposedly bad parenting skills, whatever those skills might be, try to do 
their utmost to ensure that their children acquire these values as virtues because otherwise 
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their children would not be well equipped for social life.  The question that arises, 
however, is how best do those parents try to habituate their children to internalize those 
values so that the values would form part of the moral fabric of the children‟s lives?  
Probably it is here that such parents falter. In any case, however one may elect to account 
for parental failings, I should point out that while the focus of “virtuecrats” has been on 
children, it is the adults in society who have mostly exemplified the decline of moral 
values in contemporary society in its most conspicuous form.
29
  Recall the illustrative 
examples I provided at the beginning.  So, in light of those examples and my subsequent 
discussion it appears, to me at least, that children have been unfairly presented as the 
sources of the decline in question.  
Whether or not adult moral misconduct derives from lack of habituation in the 
virtues is beyond the scope of this paper.  It is quite possible that morally aberrant adults 
are absolutely beyond redemption, so there is no way of inculcating in them sound moral 
dispositions in the Aristotelian and Humean senses. In that case, and from a rights-based 
perspective, punishment would seem to be appropriate in dealing with their moral and 
criminal transgressions.  This is on the hypothesis that such adults, seen as criminals, 
whether in the moral or legal domain, are gamblers or risk-takers.
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  Thus, qua gamblers 
(or as risk-takers), they are to be held liable for the consequences of their risks especially 
when caught.  But insofar as dealing with the young, it stands to reason that unless we 
induce in them the type of mentality (read character) that would be conducive to positive 
conduct much will not be gained in our endeavor to stave off the tide of moral decline.  It 
is for this reason that we should attempt to create sound moral dispositions in them.  That 
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way, we would hopefully be able to provide a morally sound foundation for morally 
sound adults.  
Which brings me to the question whether or not the moral education of children 
should be the province of the state (public) or the parents (private), and if so what 
becomes of parental rights?  But this question represents the issue of the moral education 
of children in terms of a false dichotomy.  It is certainly not an either/or proposition 
whether responsibility for the moral education of children should lie with the state or with 
the parents.
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  If we construe a model individual as a model citizen and vice versa, then it 
stands to reason that both the home (the private domain in which the individual is 
nurtured) and the state (the public venue in which the individual asserts her/his 
citizenship) should not be seen in oppositional terms in trying to mold the child morally.  
Rather, they should work in mutually supportive ways to accomplish this endeavor.  To 
illustrate this point, consider that if a child (say) is disruptive in school (public), then 
her/his conduct may well have to do with some aspect or other of the home (private).  To 
that extent, how the school addresses the issue will have serious implications for the 
home.  And how the home deals with the moral and perhaps also some of the non-moral 
issues affecting the child should be of concern to the school. In that case, both society and 
the home stand a better chance of addressing the matter that gave rise to the child‟s 
disruptive conduct in the first place if they work conjointly.  
It does not follow from the fact of the school‟s involvement, however, that the 
parents‟ right to bringing up their child as they think fit is being violated.  Such a position 
on parental rights assumes falsely that those rights are absolute and inviolable.  But they 
are not, as is clear from the fact that the state could intervene at any time, even by 
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removing a child from the home, if it considers that the child‟s welfare is in jeopardy.  
This shows that there are limits to parental rights, and those limits begin to emerge when 
parental rights are deemed to conflict or are considered inconsistent with certain 
expectations of society, expectations that are situated in the domain of the state.  If my 
reasoning is sound, then it is certainly not the case that the moral education of children is 
the exclusive province of either the state (public) or the home (private).  On the contrary, 
the state, via its public institutions, should be involved in reinforcing the values that 
invariably originate in the home.  These are the values that I set out at the beginning as a 
precondition for social life.  This means, in effect, that the supposed political concerns 
reflected in the public/private dichotomy are deprived of their seeming force.  
One final objection that needs to be addressed in closing is that an emphasis on 
the moral virtues is aimed at transforming children into compliant and unthinking beings 
through indoctrination.  This is so, the objection goes, especially given the method of 
education proposed by some advocates of the virtues, a method that calls for a return to 
the traditional values through rote learning of the classic works in the Western canon 
while discouraging, even deprecating, critical thinking as a postmodernist phenomenon.
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But does subscription to virtue ethics necessarily imply a repudiation of critical thinking 
as this objection supposes?  The answer is definitely no.  One only needs to read 
Aristotle‟s account of the mean to see this.  Remember that the doctrine of the mean is 
the doctrine of right reason.  It is a doctrine about how the agent would choose and act in 
appropriate circumstances.  Assume the agent already has a given character-trait, say 
magnanimity.  Then, guided by the right rule of reason, s/he would know what kinds of 
situation require her/him to be magnanimous, when to show magnanimity, to whom s/he 
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should be magnanimous, to what extent s/he should be magnanimous etc.  In other words, 
s/he would not be magnanimous indiscriminately simply because s/he has the character-
trait in question.  What this means is that for Aristotle, as for Hume, the acquisition of a 
given character-disposition does not entail that the agent ceases to engage in critical 
thinking.  To the contrary, her/his critical thinking skills are fully operational in all moral 
situations that require her/him to make choices or perform actions.  Thus, while the 
objection in question may rightly apply to the so-called return-to-tradition “virtuecrats,” 
as Nash might refer to such advocates of virtue ethics, it certainly does not apply to 
“virtuecrats” of the Aristotlian or Humean stripe.  To sum up, an advocacy of virtue 
ethics is quite compatible with moral reasoning.
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End Notes 
1
 See Aristotle Politics in The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed.) Richard McKeon (New 
York: Random House, 1941). Subsequent references to Aristotle‟s views will be made 
from this volume; and David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (eds.) L.A. Selby-
Bigge/P.H. Nidditch, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).  Hereafter 
abbreviated as T., with page numbers in parenthesis.  I am of course aware that Hume is 
very wary of saying that nature design anything.  However, I do not believe that 
expressing his view of the natural human limitation using the concept of design as I have 
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done violates his anti-teleological view of nature; so much should not be read into the 
term design” in my description. 
 
2
 Some might be quick to use this remark as an argument against homosexuality citing 
Aristotle.  But that such a position would be at variance with Aristotle‟s view should be 
clear from a careful reading of Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics, especially his view of 
friendship.  There, if my reading is correct, Aristotle takes the ideal of friendship (read 
love) to be a relation between men.  See Book viii of his Nicomachean Ethics in Richard 
McKeon (ed.) The Basic Works of Aristotle. Hereafter abbreviated as N.E. 
 
3
 See Hobbes, Leviathan (ed.) Edwin Curley (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1994).  See particularly Part 1, esp. chaps. Pp. 13-14. 
 
4
 Hume, for instance, takes the principle of sympathy as foundational to morality.  See 
Treatise 3.1.1., esp. pp. 575-578.  True, sympathy itself is not a value; rather it is a 
principle that links human beings together, on the basis of which humans are able to form 
society and to establish moral values.  Yet by this principle it seems that Hume is simply 
highlighting what I have characterized as the ontological dependency of the human being.  
 
5
 Aristotle, N.E. Book II where Aristotle says that moral virtue, in the sense of a state of 
character, “comes about as a result of habit” (1103a 15)  
 
6
 There are various sources on Clinton Impeachment among which is Rutgers University 
Web site http://www.eagleton.rutgers.edu/e-gov/e-politicalarchive-Clintominpeach.htm 
 
7
 Foley resigned his Congressional seat in disgrace and the case against Governor 
Blagojevich is pending.  For information on Senator Stevens, Congressman Mark Foley 
and Governor  Blagojevich see the following respective sources: “Senator Charged with 
Lying About Gifts,” CBS Evening News, July 29, 2008; “Rep. Foley Quits in Page 
Scandal,” Washingtonpost.com, Saturday, September 30, 2006; and “Feds: Governor 
Tried to „auction Obama‟s Seat,” MSNBC News and News Services; updated 4.17 P.M. 
CT, Tuesday, December 9, 2008. 
 
8
 My ascription of the breakdown of basic values to liberalism should not be construed as 
a repudiation of liberalism and a clarion call with the conservatives for a return to so-
called “traditional values.”  That should be clear from my characterization of the 
breakdown itself as an “unfortunate by-product and unintended consequence.” 
 
9
 For more on this, see Will Kymlicka, “Liberalism,” in Ted Honderich (ed.) The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford U. P. 1995), pp. 483-485; also 
Chris Brown, “Liberalism and the Globalization of Ethics,” in The Globalization of 
Ethics (eds.) William M. Sullivan and Will Kymlicka (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge U.P., 2007), chap. 9; esp. pp. 151-161.  
 
10
 See John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (ed.) Peter Laslett (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963).  See particularly Second Treatise, chapters 5-8. 
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11
 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in Jeremy Bentham/John Stuart Mill The Utilitarians 
(Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973), p. 484.  Hereafter cited as 
Mill, with page numbers in parenthesis. 
 
12
 I am of course begging the question about how any form of conduct can be evaluated 
morally.  But such question-begging is not fatal or central to my present general purpose, 
which is only to show that liberalism is at the root of the breakdown of core values in 
contemporary society.  
 
13
 William A. Galston, “Liberal Virtues and the Formation of Civic Character,” in 
Seedbeds of Virtue (eds.) Mary Ann Glendon and David Blankenhorn (New York: 
Madison Books, 1995), 41-51. 
 
14
 Incidentally, there are laws against the kind of sexual relationships that NAMBLA is 
claiming and the fact that there are laws against adult-minor sexual relations in general 
suggests that the supposed right claimed by the group is illegitimate.  NAMBLA might 
wish to argue that all such laws violate its members‟ First Amendment right of free 
association guaranteed by the Constitution, and so are unconstitutional.  But this all the 
more underscores the point I made earlier that even when there are legal proscriptions 
against certain forms of conduct, there are those who may wish to challenge such 
proscriptions on the ground that they are being denied their rights. 
 
15
 David Popenoe, “The Roots of Declining Social Virtue: Family, Community, and the 
Need for a “Natural Communities Policy”,” in Glendon and Blakenhorn (eds.) Seedbeds 
of Virtue, chapter 4; hereafter cited as Popenoe with page numbers in parenthesis. 
 
16
 Popenoe acknowledges the benefits modernity has brought to society in the form of “its 
creative impulses [that] generated the growth of science and technology” and 
considerable material prosperity.  However, he also laments what he deems the immense 
social costs at which modernity‟s success has been obtained: “personal pathology and 
community disorder” (85).  His overall assessment of modernity is that modernity has 
resulted in “moral relativism, hyper-individualism and . . . community social decline” 
(86). 
 
17
 Patrick J. Buchanan, The Death of the West (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 2002).  
Hereafter cited as Buchanan with page numbers in parenthesis. 
 
18
 For a contrasting and relatively balanced treatment of the sixties‟ social revolution see 
Andrew B. Schoedinger, Where Have All Our Values Gone? (Xlibris Corporation, 2005), 
chapters 4 and 5.  Unlike Buchanan, Schoedinger attributes the breakdown of values in 
contemporary society to a confluence of factors that, in his view, center around an all-
pervading narcissistic impulse (chapter 9) and challenges to “the authority of family, 
schools, government and church” (p.120). 
 
 37 
19
 See, for example, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 1990), chap. 3, esp. pp.48-53; Justice Sandra Day O‟Connor, 
Symposium address in Pace-Setting  Women of the 20
th
 Century, Centennial Birthday 
Festival, National Cathedral School, Washington, DC, October 12-25, 2000, pp. 31-36; 
and Virginia Held, “Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory,” in Steven M. Cahn and 
Peter Markie (eds.), Ethics,  Fourth ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford U.P. 2007), ch. 
41. 
 
20
 Ibid. Young, pp. 50-51 
 
21
 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter From Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963; rpt. in James 
A. Montmarquet and William H. Hardy (eds.), Reflections: An Anthology of African 
American Philosophy (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000), p. 198. 
 
22
 Quoted from “Pat Buchanan‟s Skeleton Closet,” p.7 of 27, in 
http://www.realchange.org/buchanan.htm 
 
23
 Contra Buchanan, Amartya Sen, in his essay “Population: Delusion and Reality” (The 
New York Review of Books, Vol. 41, Number 15, 1994), has argued that white population 
is not in decline or in jeopardy as is sometimes claimed.  According to Sen, even given 
the current population explosion of Asia and Africa combined, the population increase in 
these continents combined “is considerably below what its share was in 1650 or 1750.”  
Sen notes further that even if one grants the United Nations‟ prediction that the 
population of these two continents would increase to 78.5% by 2050, still, “the Asians 
and Africans would [only] return to being proportionately almost exactly as numerous as 
they were before the European industrial revolution.”  Be it noted that during the 
industrial revolution the population of Europe and North America rose rapidly in contrast 
to those of Africa and Asia that diminished.  Specifically, during the nineteenth century, 
says Sen, “while the inhabitants of Asia and Africa grew by about 4 percent per decade or 
less, the population of “the area of European settlement” grew by around 10 percent 
every decade.” (p.4).  For more on this issue see also Sheldon Wein, “Entitlements to 
Starvation: The Limits to Population.” (Unpublished manuscript) 
 
24
 Of course, Buchanan assumes that all people of color in Europe are of non-European 
ancestry; similarly, on his view, it would follow that to be an American of European 
ancestry is to be white.  That this assumption is patently false is evident from the fact that 
since citizenship is acquired by birth, as by naturalization, people of color born in Europe 
are Europeans in the same way that people of color born in the United States are 
Americans.  Another way of seeing this point is to say that there are non-white Europeans 
and non-white Americans, as there are white Africans (e.g. white South Africans, 
Zimbabweans and West Africans).  
 
25
 For some discussions of  Hume‟s view see my “Hume‟s Theory of Moral 
Responsibility in the Treatise: Some Unresolved Matters,” Dialogue: Canadian 
Philosophical Review,” Vol. 31 (1) 1992, pp.3-18; “Hume on Character, Action and 
Causal Necessity,” Auslegung, Vol 16 (2) 1990, pp.149-164; and “Yet Another Look at 
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Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume‟s Ethical System,” Journal of 
Philosophical Research in Vol. 17, 1992, pp.225-238. 
 
26
 For more on this, see J.B.Schneewind, “Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Ethics,” 
in Lawrence C. Becker (ed.), A History of Western Ethics (New York and London: 
Garland Publishing, 1992), ch.8, p.92. 
 
27
 I am of course mindful of Socrates‟ concern with the life of moral virtue as 
demonstrated in Plato‟s Apology.  Moreover, as Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out, 
Aristotle acknowledged his predecessors who had treated of the virtues, from Homeric 
poets all the way down to Plato.  Even so, as MacIntyre notes, “it is Aristotle whose 
account of the virtues decisively constitutes  the classical tradition as a tradition of moral 
thought, firmly establishing a good deal that his poetic predecessors had only been able to 
assert or suggest and making the classical tradition a rational tradition” (Alasdair 
MacIntyre, After Virtue, [Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981], 
p. 138). 
 
28
 Cp. John J. Bricke‟s analysis of the nature of character in Hume‟s ethics in “Hume‟s 
Conception of Character,” South-Western Journal of Philosophy, 5, (1974), pp. 107-113. 
 
29
 Some of these concerns are raised by Robert J. Nash in his book, Answering the 
“Virtuecrats”: A Moral Conversation on Character Education (New York and London: 
Teachers College, Columbia University Press, 1997). See chapter 1, esp. pp. 8-9. 
 
30
 As is evident, I am here using the concept of “virtuecrat” drawing upon Nash‟s 
characterization of advocates of moral virtue as an antidote to societal moral decline. The 
title of Nash‟s book already cited sums up his idea: Answering the “Virtuecrats”: A 
Moral Conversation on Character Education. 
 
31
 See Mane Hajdin, “Criminals as Gamblers: A Modified Theory of Pure Restitution,” in 
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. 26 (1) 1987, pp.77-86. 
 
32
 My position here on the education of the young clearly differs from Aristotle‟s. In the 
Politics Aristotle argues that the education of the children is to be in the hands of the state 
on the ground that “The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under 
which he lives,” and therefore his education “should be public, and not private.” (Politics 
1337a, 15-25) And in the Nicomachean Ethics he suggests that the role of the legislator is 
to establish the laws that would determine the right type of training and habits that the 
youth should acquire in order to become virtuous individuals See N.E. 1180a. 
 
33
 Robert Nash, among others, advances this (kind of) objection. See his Answering the 
“Virtuecrats,” pp.45-49. 
 
34
 I thank Sheldon Wein for his support and encouragement throughout the writing of this 
paper. Wein also made some pointed criticisms of aspects of my discussion that helped 
me sharpen my focus and improve my argument, and for this I am particularly grateful. 
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suggestions for improvement. 
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